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The machine tcx>l industry constitutes a very small part of the metal 
working sector in all countries. For example^ in Sweden in 1977, it 
1 accounted for only 2.6% of the value added in the engineering sector. 
It is nevertheless a critical branch as it produces the machinery which 
produces all other machinery; both for the capital and consumer goods 
sectors. This characteristic of the machine tool industry means that any 
productivity increase in machine tools^ both prcduct and process, will 
have repercussions throughout the whole economy. Furthermore, the machine 
tool industry is, historically as well as at present, an important centre 
2 
of innovative activity. This has been analysed historical ly by Rosenberg, 
and today the machine tool industry is once again a locus of innovative 
activity with the di f fusion of electronic control systems to machine tools . 
The role of the machine tool sector in generating and dif fusing innovations 
has made i t of central concern to many governments in the advanced countries 
as well as in some developing countries o Several Newly Industrializing 
Countries (NICs) have also achieved h i gh levels o f production of machine 
tools. In 1979, Brazil was the 13th largest producer of machine tools in 
J the world, Taiwan was the 18th largest and Argentina was the 23rd largest , 
ahead of such countries as Aú s t r a l i a s Portugal and South A f r i ca . ' ' 
The general problem which w i l l be addressed in this chapter is - under 
what conditions wi l l the recent rapid technical change in products in the 
machine tool sector increase the technological gap between the developed 
countries and the NICs? The technical change referred to is the trend 
towards the substitution of standard machine tools by numerically controlled 
(NC) machine tools. The speci f ic task w i l l be to analyse the conditions 
under which the leading Argentinian lathe producer w i l l be able to move from 
the design and production of standard lathes to numerically controlled 
lathes. 
NC lathes i s today synonymous with computer controlled lathes and l ike 
many computer controlled technologies i t has distinct advantages over 
"" i ts manually operated counterparts= Without going into detai ls , i t i s 
clear that thé NC lathe i s a technology which saves both capital and 
'' labour when used in many applications now, and the number is increasing. 
k 
It saves most on ski l led labour. This i s very advantageous to investors 
in the diveleped eeuntriei whert ekilled labeur usually ds net' wark 
shi f ts and where hence, capital is not fu l ly ut i l i zed . The sk i l l 
saving character of NC lathes could also be said to be advantageous to 
investors in the NICs, where skil led labour often is very scarce. 
The advantages associated with NC lathes has led to the fast penetration 
of them in the developed country markets. In table 1 we can see how the 
value of production of standard and NC lathes have altered in the main 
non-socialist producing countries. The countries account for 84?é of 
the non-social ist world's production of machine tools^ We can note that 
in 1975, when the f i r s t microelectronically controlled NC unit was 
introduced, the share of NC lathes in the total production of lathes was 
only 27.9/0 whilst i t had grown to 54?ó in 1980. We can furthermore note 
that the annual rate of growth in the production of NC lathes since 1977 
has been in the order of 40?ó, while the rate of growth of standard lathes 
has been much below. 
Table 2 reveals how the growing importance of the production of NC lathes 
is ref lected in the share of NC lathes in the total investment in lathes 
in a number of developed countries. The share of NC lathjes is generally 
above 50?¿ of the investment in lathes in these developed countries. 
Whilst i t i s not l ike ly to reach 100?¿, everthing points to a continued 
decline in the importance of standard lathes. Hence, there i s at the 
world level a substitution of NC lathes for standard lathes. 
Realizing what i s happening, a number of lathe producers in the NICs -
in Argentina, Braz i l , Taiwan and South Korea, are attempting to switch 
their production over from standard lathes to NC lathes. We wi l l in this 
paper, analyse under what conditions the leading Argentinian lathe 
producer w i l l able to successfully make the switch. 
I 
We wi l l analyse three factors determining the answer to this question. 
The f i r s t factor of importance i s how the international competitive 
situation has altered with the growth of importance of NC lathes. The 
second factor i s the size of the Argentinian market for NC lathes. The /-,, 
third factor i s the structure and capabi l i t ies of the f i rm. These factors 
wi l l be dealt with in sections 2 - 4 . In section 5 we wi l l draw out the Jr 
% 
strategic implications and discuss policy at the level of the firm and 
at the level of the state. Finally, in section 6 we w i l l summarize the 
mjiin r»nnr»l t iQ i r»r»c 









































* Japan, US, West Germany, France, UK, Italy and Sweden. 










Investment in NC Lathes as % of Investment in All Lathes 
US JAPAN UK FRANCE SWEDEN 
na na na na 34.4 
na 23.4 na na 42.6 
na 28.2 18.6 26.4 41.6 
na 40.8 21.3 46.7 52.6 
na 40.1 na na 69.9 
na 50.8 38.4 73.8 69.5 
56.5 na 47.3 na na 





2. The international structure of the NC lathe branch 
s L . 
* I 
The most important single factor determining the viability of NC lathe 
production in a NIC, or in any other country for that matter, is the 
recent Japanese expansion. Since 1975, the Japanese have drastically 
increased their share of the worlds production. The 'world' is defined as 
U.S., Japan, West Germany, France, Italy, U.K. and Sweden. Table 3 shows 
that in value terms, the Japanese increased their share of world production 
from about 15% in 1975 to between 32 to 35% in 1980 . As the Japanese yen has 
increased significantly in value in relation to the dollar, we have used 
both current and 1976 years exchange rates in calculating the value of 
production. 
In terms of units, table ^ shows that Japan increased its share of world 
production frcm 31.7% in 1975 to 60.4% in 1980. The large increase in 
production in Japan has been associated with an export drive and Japan's 
share ©f the world market (as defined above) excluding Japan's internal 
market, rose fran less than 6% in 1975 to between 21 and 26% in 1980 in 
-J value terms. In terms of units it rose fran 12.6% in 1975 to 45.5% in 
1980. Hence, in 1980, nearly half of the NC lathes sold in the non Japanese 
western market was made in Japan. This can be seen in table 5. in other 
words, there has been an excepticaially rapid shift in world production to 
Japan. 
Ttie rise of the Japanese has taken place in a period of very rapid 
growth in world production of NC lathes. Both in terms of units and value 
(not deflated) the yearly increases has been in the order of 40%. To 
a large extent, this increase has been due to the Japanese growth. In 
terms of units, the growth in-Japanese production accounted for about 70% of 
the world growth of production, whilst in terms of value Japanese growth 





Table 3 The production of NC lathes in Japan,Europe and the U.S. (U.S. dollars artí % of wrld producticn) 
Japan Europe U.S. 
(1) (%) (2) (%) (1) (%) (2) {%) (1) (2) 
1975 66.0 15.2 66.0 14.8 156.4 35.9 166.2* 37.3 212,7 48.8 47.8 
1976. 38.7 17.8 88.7 17.8 203.2 40.8 203.2 40.8 205.9 41.3 41.3 
1977 143.7 23.8 159.0 25.4 263.3 43.7 271.5 43.3 195,3 32.4 31.2 
1978 194.8 ' 24.1 274.9 29.3 373.4 46."3 425.8 45.3 237.2 29.4 25.2 
1979 331.0 29.9 448.5 34.2 427.4 38.6 514.4 39.2 347.2 31.4 26.5 
1980 513.7 31.8 673.0 35.3 619.9 38.3 751.7 39.4 481.0 39.8 25.2 
(1) 1976 exchange rates 
(2) Current exchange rates 
* excluding Italy 
** West Germany, France, Italy, U.K. and Sweden 
Sources: elaboration of data supplied by the varioué countries' machine tool producers associations 
> «c r^ 
I 
I 
Table ^ The production of NC lathes in Japan, Europe and the U.S. (units) 
Year Japan Európe** U.S. Ttotal 
no % no % no % 
1975 1,359 30,0 1,535 33,8 1 ,640 36.2 4,534 
1976 2,073 41,0 1,656 32.8 1 ,321 26.1 5,050 
1977 3,900 52,6 2,332 31.5 1,178 15.9 7,410 
1978 4,986 49,8 3,551 35.5 1,464 14.6 10,001 
1979 8,065 57,9 3,505 25.2 2,354 16.9 13,924 
1980 12,036 60.4 5,137* 25.8 2,751 13.8 19,924 
* assumed a production of 300 units in Sweden 
** West Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Sweden 
Sources as in Table 5 
.y' 
Table 5. Japanese share of non-Japanese world market 
Year Units Value 
(1) (2) 
1975 12.6 5.7 5.6 
1976 22.1 9.0 9.0 
1977 29.0 13.2 14.2 
1978 34.8 16.9 21.0 
1979 41.7 20.9 24.3 
1980 45.5 23.6 26.5 
(1) 1976 years exchange rates 
(2) Current exchange rates 






How can w© explain th© iucetii ©f th© Japanese? There are four seti of 
factors whieh are important to understand if we are to analyst the impli-
cations of this expansion for a NIC. These are: firm siie, new design con-
cepts, pricing policy and the size of the Japanese hone market. 
2.1. Firm size 
The discussion of the size of firms will be divided between the production 
of the machine tools proper and the NC units, as the micro ccnputers are 
generally produced by separate firms. 
2.1.1. The production of the machine tools proper 
Let us begin by stating that the cost structures of production change 
over time, changing the requirements for successful competition. To 
maintain a defensible long term business position, i t i s important to 
anticipate and be ready to respond to, or to in i t i a te these changes. 
For example, when electromechanical switch gear for the telecommunication 
industry were replaced by electronic ones, manufacturing costs, for 
example labour costs, were replaced by the ab i l i ty to purchase materials 
at a low cost as the prime element defining overal l production costf 
Similarly, the cost structure alters when we move from the production 
of standard lathes to NC lathes. As table 6 shows, the main element in the 
production cost for NC lathes is bought-in materials, as in the case of 
electronic switch gear. The content of the material also changes from 
primarily domestically produced and with high labour content such as foundry 
items, to standard items bought from internationally specialized firms which 
produce very long series. Given that these firms achieve'high scale advant-
ages in production, they give very high discounts to the firms buying large 
numbers of units. Hence, there are large scale advantages in the acquis-
ition of materials which accounts for the largest share of production costs. 
It is not uncommon for large machine tool producers to get up to 30 - 35% 
discount when they buy their components such as the numerical control 
unit, the e lectr ical motors and the ballscrew. Furthermore, the direct 
labour content i s reduced considerably when production i s switched to NC 
lathes. Hence, wage costs have lost a l o t of their significance in defining 
overall production costs, instead, acquiring components at a low price i s 
of great importance. 
- 9 -
Table 6 Structure of production costs of one firm'sCNC lathe when 
produced in very small ipatches 







out of which 
out of which 
Capital cost 17% 
a) fixed capital 14 
b) work in progress 
and inventories 3 
Labour costs 17% 
a) white collar 8 
b) operators 7 
c) administration 2 
Miscellaneous 2% 
Source; Interview with firm representative 
rs 
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Source: Boston Consulting Group: A framework For a Swedish Industrial Policy, Appendix 8. 
other sources of scale advantages which, have become of greater importance 
with the sh i f t to NC lathes and the rapid growth of that market i s the 
increased need for R & D and for a marketing and distribution network. 
Whilst the former needs no explanation in times of fast changes in product 
technology and the introduction of new technical elements, electronics, 
into the product, the latter deserves some comments. In general, we can 
say that the machine tool business is characterized by a fragmented cust-
omer base with signif icant requirements for information and after sales 
services such as repair and maintenance. With the sh i f t to NC 
lathes, the requirements for both information and repair and maintenance 
have increased substantial ly. This i s mainly due to the fact that far 
most customers the electronic unit is l ike a black box and that the sk i l l 
requirements for service and maintenance have increased. Consequently, the 
users tend to rely more upon the service network of the supplier^ Table 7 
i l lustrates the magnitude of the costs of sales as a percent of total costs. 
The table shows that this percentage may reach 50?á when only a few units 
are sold in a market and that i t s t i l l accounts for 17 - 18?ó when 50 Units 
are sold. Hence, the scale economies are very substantial. 
To summarize, the key word to achieve a strong competitive position in 
the NC lathe business i s scale advantages. A general explanation of the ^ 
success of the Japanese i s that they anticipated and took advantage of the 
growing scale advantages. This is reflected in table 8 where 
we can see the difference in the structure of the NC lathe sector 
in the U.K., France, West Germany, Italy and Japan. There are several points 
to note: Firstly, the largest Japanese firm in 1978 produced four-times.the. 
number of units as the largest firm in the four countries mentioned above, 
whilst three years before that (1975) the largest Japanese firm was at the same 
level as the largest European firms. Furthermore, the fcajr following Japanese 
firms had an average production of 525 NC lathes in 1978 whilst the European 
firms ranged between 35 and 210. In fact, the 16 largest firms in the four 
European countries produced 1,8*15 NC lathes in 1978 whilst the five largest 
Japanese firms produced 3,100 units in the same year. Hence, there is a great 
difference in the structure of the European branch and the Japanese. Whilst 
the data in the table is frcxn 1978, at least two Japanese firms, Yamazaki and 
k^3ri Seiki have plants capable of producing between 2 and 3,000 NC lathes 
p.a. As the scale advantages are significant, this increase in the size of fe, 
the production units has raised the minimum efficient scale of production 
of NC lathes. We will later come back to what this implies for the NICs. 
Table i SamG eompafotiVQ date en NC lothQ pgj^^uetien j.n_j_a_pan and Europe 
toneentration 
Country Produetion Large i'at ÉTrm 4 li srgest Average ©f the next 
of NC lathes 1 No % No to leader firms 
UK (1977) 270 31 80 83 225 50 
France (1978) 330 45 150 80 265 35 
BRD (1978) 1255 20 250 70 875 210 
Italy (1978) 709 20 140* 64 450 103 
Japan (1978) ' 4986 19 1000 64* 3100 525 
Japan (1975) 1359 19 270 60 700 105 
Japan (1970) 660 40 250 92 610 90 
* Based on 1977 years concentration data ** five largest firms 
Sources: For Europe; Elaboration on Planning Research + Systems Limited: 
A market study of numerically controlled machine tools in the 
United Kingdom, France, Italy and West Germany, October 1979. 
For Japan; Elaboration on data in Metalworking, Engineering and 
Marketing, March 1980,p»26, Today's Machine Tool Industry: The 
Recent Technical Tréñds in NC Lathes, 1977 and Progressive Deve-
lopment of Numerically Controlled Machine Tools in Japan, 1977. 
2.1.2. The production of the NC units 
•Hie NC unit accounts for between 15 and 2^% of the cost of the NC lathe. 
As the,largest item of cost in the NC unit is depreciation for develop-
nent costs, the scale advantages are very substantial.Hence, the structure of 
this sector in Japan and elsewhere is important to analyse. 
p 
There are a minimum of seven Japanese NC producers. By far the most important 
one, Fujitsu Fanuc, has however between 60 and 70% of the market. In 
table 9 we can see that the si;»ctacular growth of NC lathes post 1975 is 
matched by an equivalently spectacular growth of NC units.The largest 
Bjropean producer is Siemens, which sold, according to one source,^ 
- 13 -
Table 9 Annual production of NC units by Fujitsu Fanuc 
year no 
1975 2,000 





Source: Sou 1981:10 Datoriseringen inom verkstadsindustrin 
3,200 units in Europe in 1979. However, only 1,500 units of these were 
their own, the remaining were Fanuc units for which Sieniens have the right 
to distribute in Europe. As Siemens and Fanuc have a joint firm, General 
Numeric, which markets their products in the U.S. (15% market share), the 
total production level of Siemens ought not to be higher thaft 3.000 p.a. it 
Other European firms have a substantially lower production. For example 
SMT and Kongsberg in Scandinavia do not reach 500 units.p.a. Hence, y 
Fanuc's producticMi is six to seven times that of Siemens' and forty times 
that of the Scandinavian makers.Other major firms, such as General Electric 
and Olivetti produce substantially less than Fanuc. 
Of course, this difference in structure may explain the success of Fanuc 
but should not, in a competitive environment, explain the success of the 
Japanese machine tool builders. There are however three important considera-
ticiis to bear in mind. Firstly, the exceptionally rapid changes in the 
technology. In four years the world market underwent dramatic changes and that 
is a very short time, especially for an atonised industry like the machine 
tool industry. This is manifested in the fact that smaller European machine tool 
builders still buy NC units from a national and more expensive supplier, 
e.g. ASEA in Sweden. In other words, small firms take some time to adjust 
and acquire information etc. 
A 
Secondly, the simultaneous increase in production of NC lathes among a 
small number of firms and the production of NC units have allowed the Ja-
panese machine tool builders to reap substantial benefits. For 
a firm buying about 1,000 units p.a., the rebate can be as large as 35%. 
n 
It would conceivably have been possible for the Japanese machine tool 
builders to buy, say, General Electric's NC units with a rebate. The j^int 
is however that in times of substantial and rapid changes in technology, like 
the introduction of microprocessors in NC, the geographical nearness and 
the historically strong design links between NC producers and machine tool 
builders in Japan have probably speeded up the diffusion process and hence 
rebate possibilities. The nearness and history of collaboration was also 
exceptionally important due to the fact that the Japanese NC producers initi-
ated the development of simpler nC units which could be applied to more simple 
10 
machine tools, like smaller lathes. A very xmportant part of the Japanese 
machine tool builders' success lies in the development of new design concepts 
for which the availability of cheap NC units was a prerequisite. Hence, there 
were strong ccmplementarities in design developments between NC units and 
NC lathes. Of course, today, any machine tool builder can buy a Japanese 
NC unit but we again want to enphasize the tin« eleirent in the diffusion of 
knowledge in explaining the rapid success of the Japanese post 1975. 
2.1.3 Design concepts 
NC lathes are not an honogeneous product. In fact, the price ranges today 
between 80,000 and 250,000 dollars. This has not always been the case 
though. An important factor in explaining the Japanese success has been the 
introduction of new design concepts. The first important point to keep in 
mind is that the development of cheap NC units was a prerequisite for the 
diversification of NC lathes into the less carvplex part of the spectrum. 
11 As the Japanese themselves said already in 1977: 
"...the tendency of diversification in turned parts in the middle 
and small lot sizes became notable while the cost reduction in NCs 
has been realized owing to electronic technique innovations, thus 
making it possible to develop inexpensive NC machine tools." 
Two main types of cheap NC lathes may be identified. First, a production 
type NC lathe which is small and developed for turning smaller parts for 
autonoblles, electric appliances etc. Second, a low cost type of NC lathe 
which has been especially designed so that small and medium size firms 
can afford to buy them. It is these low cost NC lathes which have played 
12 the rrast important role in the success of the Japanese NC lathe industry. 
The validity of this partial explanation of the Japanese success is indt-
- 15 -
of both quality and performance. Out of a li-st of all NC lathes made in 
Japan]^38% had a motor power of less than 15kw, another 38% had a motor 
power between 15 and 30kw and only 24% had more than 30kw. In coTiparison, 
the largest Swedish NC lathe producer, which is one of the leading 
non Japanese ones, has no model with a motor power of less than 35 kw. 
Secondly, the different strategy of the Japanese is indicated by the 
weight per unit of NC lathes. In 1979, the average weight of Japanese ^ 
exports to European and U.S. markets ranged between 4 and 4.7 tons per unit. In 
comparison, the Swedish firm's lightest NC lathe weighs 6.6 tons. Hence, the 
Japanese have gained some of their market strength via changing design 
philosophy. 
The basis for this change in philosophy is well i l lustrated in the 
14 following paragraph from a Japanese journal: 
"At the f i r s t stage, these low cost NC lathes could not be in-
troduced smoothly due to the prejudice that NC lathes should be 
machine tools of high quality equipped with luxurious functions. 
Though NC lathes of high grade with luxurious functions were 
rea l ly required for sane turning operations, i t i s a lso true that 
a l l the valuable functions are not required for a l l the turning 
operations. In many f i e l d s , NC lathes of simplif ied functions 
can su f f i c ient ly turn the parts, and many low-cost NC lathes 
are now widely accepted pos it ive ly . " 
In other words, using a performance/cost rat io , we can say that the 
Japanese have emphasized reduction in costs whilst tradit ional ly the ij> 
philosophy of European machine tool builders has been to emphasize per-
forrónce. This widening of the spectrum of choice of NC lathes has c lear ly 
had the e f f ec t of opening up new markets and, hence, permitted a move 
to mass production which was i l lustrated in the previous section. Hence, 
there are very clear links between types of custcmers, design of the 
machine tool and the scale of production of the machine tool . 
2.1 .A Pricing pol ic ies 
Traditionally, Japanese leaders of industry have put a very heavy 
emphasis on gaining large market shares in their objective function. 
Hence, a philosophy of long term gains instead of short term prof i ts pervades 
the Japanese industry. I t is very d i f f i c u l t to substantiate the argument 
that this also applies to the NC lathe industry. There exists however scsne 
information which tends to indicate that this is the case. 
F i rst ly , i t appears to be widely known in industry that the Japanese ^ 
- 16 -
are offering very substantial discounts on their NC lathes. Secondly, 
one source suggests that in the U.K. market, they are now raising their 
15 
prices after an initial hea^^ penetration of the market. Thirdly, the 
Japanese Econonic Journal reports the existence of a Japanese export 
cartel which pursues a price differentiation policy. Fourthly, the Conmittee 
of the European Coorporation of Industries of Machine Tools sent its 17 
leaders to Japan to "...urge it to learn orderly exporting." The disorderly 
conduct of the Japanese was their pricing policies. Hence, it seems very 
probable that the general pattern of emphasizing large market shares 
in Japanese industry also applies to the NC lathe industry. The price 
cojTpetitiveness arising fron low markups per sold NC lathe could thus partly 
explain the Japanese success. 
2. 1.SPomestic market size 
The size of the market for NC lathes i s roughly the same in Europe, the 
US and Japan. However, whilst the US and the European markets are heavily 
penetrated by external competition, the Japanese home market is captive. 
k In 1979, the Japanese imported only 3 NC lathes while they exported 
' 18 4 196. Whilst one possible explanation to this phenomenon could be an extreme 
specialization and superiority of the Japanese lathes, it is clear that 
Japan never imported a large number of NC lathes. The maximum was 
24 in 1971. ^^ With a captive home market of the Japanese 
size, the risks involved in a large expansion in production are of course 
considerably reduced. 
2.1.6 Conclusions 
There are two basic questions to answer. Hcftv did the Japanese do it and 
what are the implications for a NIC trying to move into production of NC 
lathes? 
To begin with the first question, there are several points to be made. 
Firstly, there has been a lot of discussion over the advantages of having 
an electronic sector in the same country for the downstream industries. 
It appears to be clear that this has been the case in this particular 
branch in Japan. This is based on the fact that it was the Japanese NC firm^ 
- 17 -
who initiated the diversification of NC units to the Cheaper, Read Only 
Memory types which have their software 'fcwild into' the hardware. Secondly, 
there has been a long history of design links between Fanuc and the Japanese 
machine tool builders. However, it is equally important to stress that '(<, 
this first advantage of the Japanese machine tool builders has now been 
eroded via a world wide availability of these cheaper NC units. Hence, ^ 
there seem to be no serious technological disadvantage for a NIC based 
firm trying to produce the low cost type NC lathe to buy in the NC units 
fran a geographical and business distance. The situation is however different 
for a firm in the more advanced part of the spectrum. For these firms, who 
rely on ccnplex product developments such as the conbinatiori of rdbotics 
and machine tools, it is vital to have an in-house electronic R&D section 
or very good design links with an electronic firm. 
Secondly, the Japanese donestic market is captive. In ccgrúDination with the 
high level of concentration, five out of twenty five firms account for 
64% of the production, this dramatically reduces the risks of an expansion. 
Thirdly, scffnebody external, but not necessarily the state, to the machine 
tool builders must have taken sane of the risks inherent in this exceptionally 
rapid expansion. It is sufficient to note that two firms have 
20 
factories producing between 2 and 3,000 NC lathes per annum. This means 
that a decision was taken to build factories whose output would be sufficiently 
large to cover the entire donestic market of Japan at the time the decision 
was taken. In other words, the market justifying such a spectacular in-
vestment was not there but had to be created. The risks are of course 
very large. It would seem implausible that the machine tool builders 
themselves could take these risks. Sane external institution would be re-
quired. It is of course difficult to know exactly which, but again, generally 
speaking, the banks'take a large part of the risks in Japan, which is 
indicated by a very low ratio of owners capital to total capital. 
Concerning the implications for the NICs which want to enter into the production 
of NC lathes, there are two diverging forces at work. Firstly, the Japanese 
have initiated a diversification in design of NC lathes towards the less 
complex end of the spectrum. This is clearly advantageous for the NICs. 
However, any NIC firm in a free trade environment would have to conpete with 
the Japanese who have very low prices, short delivery times and good service 
and maintenance network. This is the most important single factor in analysing 
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the viability of NC lat^e production in the NICs and we will return to discuss 
it in more detail after examining the other determinants. These are 
a) the size of the hane markets, b) the Argentinian firm producing NC 




3 Itie size of the home market in T^gentina 
In the previous section we argued that the very large and captive horfe 
market in Japan reduced the risks inherent in scxne of the Japanese firms' 
very rapid expansion of production of NC lathes. The size of the dcrnestic 
market in relation to the minimum efficient scale of production is a very 
important factor determining the long term viability of NC lathe production 
in any country. This is simply so since it is much easier and less costly 
to sell to the hone market than to export. Furthermore, it is usually very 
iirportant for product developments to have a stable set of custoners who 
demand new technologies and try them out when they are first produced. Most 
a d v a n c e d countries have a national champion in the machine tool industry which 
is the leading technology developer for a range of national firms. 
The existence of a relatively large heme market is of course also im-
portant for NC lathe firms in the NICs. An important task is then to describe 
the past rate of diffusion of NC lathes and, in particular, estimate the 
future size of the market for NC lathes in the NICs. 
In the case of Argentina,a leading.North American NC lathe firm claims 
2.1 
that it will be able to sell 100 units per annum durihg the next few years. 
The total market would then be higher as it is unlikely that one firm could 
monopolize the market. In another study, the Argentinian Electronic Conmission, 22 
in collaboration with Siemens, suggested that the annual market for NC 
units would be 990 for the next few years. As between 40 and 50% of the 
installed NCMTs usually are NC lathes, this would mean an annual market 
of at least 400 units. In the following section we will suggest that these 
estimates are far too optimistic and that a more realistic estimate implies 
difficult problems for technology policy. 
3.1. The present and potential size of the market for NC lathes in Argentina 
In a survey, the diffusion pattern in the past was found to be as in Table 10. The total 
number of NC lathes identified amounted to 189. To this it is reasonable to 
add 15% as sane units, particularly the older ones, were surely overlooked 
in the survey. Hence, we estimate that there were, in April 1981, 215 NC 
lathes in Argentina. Fran 1976, there has been a steady growth in the 
nuTiljer of installed units per annum; frcm 5 in 1976 to 45 in 1980. 
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Table 10 !Rie installment year of 791 pf the known NC lathes 
year no ^^  






* only to May 
Source: survey by the author 
We also estimated the potential yearly demand for NC lathes for the next 
five year period. Table 11 shows that the expected yearly market wi l l 
not be above 100 units. For an account of the method see Appendix. 
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WhetJier the potential will be realized is another matter which primarily 
depends on a) the availability of skills required to maintain and 
service the NC lathes as well as knowledge of the NC technology among 
the firms in Argentina, and b) the rate of investment. Concerning the first 
factor, it seems probable that the present growth rate of installed NC 
lathes will go sane way to establishing a service and maintenance structure. 
Furthermore, it will diffuse information about NC lathes and allow for an 
accumulation of experience in using NC lathes. 
Concerning the latter factor, the Argentinian econony is today(April 1981) 
in an exceptionally severe crisis. The level of capacity utilization in the 
machine tool industry is close to a mere 30% and several qapital goods industries 
have a capacity utilization of less than 50%. The crisis is, at the econonmic 
level, a function of a) the high interest rates; 30 % real interest rates 
during the past two years, b) the overvalued peso which made imports cheap 
(the overvaluation was discontinued in Spring 1981) and c) the fast reduction 
in the historically very high tariffs, causing tremendous adjustment pro-
blems. It seems futile to e;ven speculate Qn the outcome of this policy. 
One possibility could however be a restructuring of the industrial sector 
to serve the exploitation of the 'natural' corparative advantage of 
Argentina; agriculture and energy. There is today a heavy investment in 
the energy field. A minimum of 41% of the installed NC lathes serve the 
23 oil exploitation industry. If such a specialization were to cone about, 
the agricultural machinery sector would also be a large market for NC 
lathe^^ as well as the transport sector, which already today constitutes 
25 
a fair market. 
3.2. Conclusions 
A very important conclusion of this exercise is that even if we assume 
a growth rate of 5,9% in the relevant eight branches ( a very optimistic 
assumption), the size of the local market is so limited that a hypothetical 
firm producing NC lathes in Argentina, in a free trade context, would have 
to base its production on sales on export markets. In relationship to the 
size of the production units in Europe and particularly Japan, the doinestic 
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market in Argentina is only marginal. The same,applies also to other NICs. 
For example, the Republic of Korea's import of NC lathes, which is roughly 
the same as investment in NC lathes due to very low donestic production levels, 
was 50 units in 1978, 115 units in 1979 and 45 units in 1980. fhe limited 
lcx:al markets has very important implications for technology policy and we 
will turn to that later in the essay. First we will discuss the history of 
the leading Argentinian lathe producer and analyse how the structure it 
has built up during twenty years of growth affects its possiblity to produce 
NC lathes successfully. 
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A. Itie Argentinian firm producing NC lathes 
The third factor determining the viablity of NC lathe production in 
Argentina is the capabilities and the structure of the firm producing 
NC lathes. Argentina has about 100 machine tcol firms. The majority of 
these are very small and are still at a quite rudin^ntary stage in their 
technological developnent. However, there are a limited number of firms 
which have taken the step into more advanced production. According to 
27 ' 
CortezT only eight firms have reached a stage where the design is not 
done by copying imported pigment, but where qualified engineers are in-
cluded in the design team and where fabrication of prototypes is a systema-
tic activity. Qily one of these firms has itraved into production of a NCMT, 
a NC lathe. 
We will in this section look at some aspects of the history of the firm 
producing the NC lathe, as well as the relationship between government po-
licy aid the level of skills and structure of the firm. 
28 . Some aspects of the history of the firm 
Since the early 1960s, when the firm initiated its first prototype develop-
ment, the firm has placed very heavy emphasis on product design in its 
long term strategy. This means that already by the mid or late 1960s it 
had gained a position as a market and technological leader in the highly 
protected Argentinian market. The firm's share of the local lathe market 
reached 41% in 1966 and has thereafter varied between 30% and 49% (in value) 
During the past 20 years, it has gradually created a product design capa-
bility which is the result of "a high degree of 'self-reliance* in design. 
Ihe range of products designed and produced included not only a series of 
parallel lathes but also copying, revolver and semi-autonatic lathes as 
well as a milling machine and finally, two NC lathes. It is important to 
note here that the firm has gradually increased the coiplexity of the pro-
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"In the early days of numerical control, it was not uncorimon to 
fit existing machine tools as distinct from machine tools designed 
and made for use with NC. Retrofitting, as this is called, did pro-
duce soTie successful NC machines but it also produced many unsatis-
factory ones. The mechanical characterictics of conventional machine 
tools made prior to 1955-60 - stiffness, frictional characteristics 
of slideways and feed drive systems - were often unsuitable for use 
with NC and retrofitting of this kind is now unusual except for 
some of the simpler and cheaper NC systems" 
A 
ducts; fran the first parallel lathe, through copying lathes and finally 
the NC lathes. It was clear from interviews that there was a gradual 
increase in design capability and that the step taken to the NC lathes 
would not have been possible if the copying lathes had not been designed 
previously. Hence, the chief of the design team was quite clear that it would 
have been impossible to go straight item the design of parallel lathes to 
CNC lathes. 
Before we continue, let us elaborate a bit on the relationship between 
the use of electronic control units and tíie design and production of the 
lathe. One may identify three effects: 
a) the mechanical content has been reduced in favour of electronic and 
electrical soluticais. Por example, in the main spindle drives, large mecha-
nical gear-boxes with hundreds of parts have been replaced by a variable 
speed motor. 
b) The demand for high quality on the remaining parts is much higher, in 
particular in relation to the frictional behaviour of the parts and the 
servoitechanism as well as the demand for reliability and durability. As 
a result, the design of the mechanical parts has been very much influenced by 
29 developnents in the control units. As one report states 
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30 c) the design prcx:ess has becxame more conplex. Other disciplines than 
mechanical engineering have entered the design task such as: electrical 
engineering, electronic and lately small computer techniques and servo 
techniques. As a result, machine tools are no longer designed by inventive 
engineers but require a team with a multidisciplinary approach. 
The transition of this particular firm into design and production of 
NC lathes began four years ago and has been very gradual. The first step taker 
was to buy a NCMT and to study it and learn how to use it. During this 
time, the firm also sent people abroad to learn programming. 
In the actual product developinent work, one may separate the mechanical 
parts from the electro/electronic parts. For the former, which are all, 
except for the ballscrew, produced inhouse, there were little or no problems 
during the development work. (All in all four man years were spent on 
design work) Wiis may seem rather surprising since only 40% of the value of 
• the mechanical parts are the same in their NC lathes as in their conven-
tional lathes. The relative ease of solving the problems was due to three 
factors: (a) the two people responsible for the mechanical parts both 
had between 20 and 25 years of design experience (b) the firm had already 
produced very high quality machine tools and (c) the firm developed a rela-
tively simple type of NC lathe and,furthermore, created a design which, 
if not a retrofit, was more of an adapted copying lathe than a fully re-
designed machine. 
Ihe electro/electronic parts of the NC lathe, i.e. the control unit, the 
motor and the electronic parts of the spindle, are brought in fron abroad. 
Ihe design work here was undertaken by an engineer with only three to four 
years of experience. His conpetence was created thrcxjgh a gradual process. 
Firstly, he was responsible for the electrical parts of a copying lathe. 
These are more conplex than in a parallel lathe, which is the main output 
of the finn. Secondly, he designed and produced a sinple form of 
electronic ccaitrol unit. The last phase was the NC lathe where he, among 
other things, designed the whole interface between the.CNC unit and the 
machine tool. 
- 27 -
However, the continued government policy of a high level of protection 
across the board did not give the firm the stimulus to take the risks 
associated with a specialization strategy. An option for the government would 
have been to reduce the tariffs for the less conplex products, i.e. the 
parallel lathes, which were suited for mass production and specialization, 
whilst keeping the high protection for the more complex products whose 
production was a vital step in the continuous accumulation of skills. The non-
selective intervention helped to create instead a firm which, inspiteof being 
a local leader and one of the best lathe produceres in Latin America, 
is cursed by five major problems: 
a) a very diversified production which consists of parallel lathes and 
products which satisfies the demand from small niches of advanced users. 
The niche mentality applies also to minor variations in the size etc 
of the parallel lathes. This results in an absence of scale economies 
as well as an absence of specialization in the design efforts. Of course, 
the problems associated with this diversification are also partly a functim 
of the limited local market; with larger markets, scxne specialization could 
take place within the firm such as in the case of the leading Brazilian 
machine tool firm. 
b) a skill structure which is probably different from the caie which would 
be required in the context of a special i zaticai strategy based on export 
markets. This is particularly evident in the very large number of productíot 
planners which are needed to cope with the producticn of a wide range of 
products. Also, whilst the design skills are advanced in the local context, 
they are weak in an international context.The design process is still 
characterized too much by the 'inventive mechanical engineer' rather than 
by a multidiscipl inary team. I t i s , of course, questionable i f this i s due 
to protection but in an international competitive environment the firm would 
have needed to have spent much'more on R&Dl 
c) interrelated with the governmental policy of protection was the creation 
of a philosophy of short térm gains and high r isk aversion. This i s parti-
cularly evident in the length of time, three years, required to develop 
the CNC lathes. The length of time needed to develop the CNC lathes also 
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shows the lack of specialization in the design efforts. In Europe, the 
design of a totally new concept takes 1.5 years whilst the Japanese develop 
adaptations in only three months. The risk aversion mentality is also 
reflected in the design of the CNC lathes. These were made on a modular 
basis with the conventional machines and so simple that they can be pro-
duced with the existing layout and machinery, implying a gradual growth of 
the CNC share of production rather than a specializaticai. However, it is 
innportant to stress that the description of the firm as á 'low risk taker' 
refers only to a comparison of what would have been required in the context 
of international competition; in a context of the national and regional 
scene, the firm is a progressive one. 
d) a lack of specialization and ejq»rts to the technologically advanced 
markets has led to a lack of information on the technological frontier. It 
is clear that the design concept was old already when the first CNC lathe 
left the factory. 
e) finally and perhaps most importantly, the lack of exports to other 
countries than Brazil and Mexico means that today the firm has no developed 
marketing network in the U.S. and Europe. Such a netvrark is an absolute 
prerequisite for exports of advanced machinery, líie importance of a network 
is reflected in the fact that a leading CMC lathe builder in Europe claims 
that its marketing network constitutes its greatest source of scale advantage 
today. Clearly, with an earlier specialization, such a network could have 
been gradually created during the past decade. 
To sum up: the past government's history of indiscriminate tariff protection 
has, in combination with a small local market, been conducive to creating a 
firm with characteristics which make it less well prepared to switch over to 




5. Technology Policy 
In the past sectiona we have discussed the changing international structure 
of the NC lathe branch, the size of the local market in Argentina 
and, finally, the structure of the leading 
Argentinian lathe producer. We will against this background discuss two 
future scenarios. We will, furthernore, attempt to discuss the conditions 
vAiich would need to be fullfilled for each scenario to be realized. This 
includes a discussion of vrfiich of the scenarios is likely to be realized. We 
will place particular eitphasis rai the role of governrtent pol ic ies. The f i r s t 
scenario involves an expansion into the world narket, i.e. a full export ori-
ented strategy, liie second scenario involves a much more limited production 
of CNC lathes and is aimed primarily at the regional markets. 
5.1. The full export oriented strategy 
We will first discuss three basic conditions for a successful move into 
the production of QIC lathes for this particular firm. The three conditicxis 
are partly determined by the international market and can thus be gene-
ralized to other NICs. 
5.1.1. Scale of operation and specialization 
As was noted in section 2, the scale of operation of the largest Japanese 
firms has increased drastically during the past five years. Hence, also 
in this traditicKially batch producing branch, there is now a move towards 
mass production principles. In order to assess the scale and specialization 
advantages involved in the manufacturing of CNC lathes, and hence assess this 
barrier to entry for a new firm, an analysis was made together with a repre-
33 sentative from the Argentinian firm. 
Table 12 gives an account of an estimation of a) advantages from specia l i -
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zation acnd b) scale advantages in the firm. The table shows that if production 
is increased from a few CNC lathes per month to about thirty per month, pro-
duction costs could be reduced by 25% per unit of output. A little more than 
a quarter of this reduction reflects the advantages from specializaticai. 
Table 12 An estimation of advantages from specialization and scale in an 
Argentinian firm producing CNC lathes % 
(1) (2) (3) 
Materials 100 100 85 
Capital 100 82 51 
Labcxir 100 76 60 
Other 100 100 75 
Total 100 93 75 
(1) Mixed output including a few CNC lathes per month. 
(2) Specialization in CNC lathes. The data reveals only specialization effects. 
(3) Specialized production of 30 CNC lathes per month. líie data includes 
both advantages fron specialization and scale advmtages. 
Source: Elaboration on data supplied by the firm 
Advantages fron specialization only arise fron a) as, since a CNC lathe 
cOTtains less moving parts than a conventional lathe, the.light machinery 
section in the firm could be reduced. Hiis is particularly important in a 
developing ccwntry which does not have an adequate conpcanent industry. This 
B 
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lack of 'back up industry' has meant that the firm itself has had to produce 
a range of conponents which an European firm would have bought fron a 
specialized producer. The result in Argentina has been a low machine utili-
zation and therefore high costs. Most of this section can now be eliminated, 
b) A reduction in the cost of sane special equipment related to the large 
number of models can now be reduced to half, c) A reduction in the large 
number of production engineering staff who plan a very diversified produc-
tion mix. d) a reduction in the number of workers. 
The sources of scale advantages are as follows: discounts for materials, 
fixed costs for' buildings and inventories as, well as increased machine 
utilization via shift work, fixed costs for design and development as 
well as for production engineering, fixed costs in administration and some 
fixed costs for electricity etc. Vie can see their relative importance in 
table 13.. 
Table 13 Sources of scale advantages with a production of 30 CMC lathes 




White collar workers 14 
Other 3 
100 
Source: as in table 6 
Discounts for materials is by far the roost important source of scale ad-
vantages (53%) and it should be renembered that only a 15% discount was 
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assumed to exist when 30 units are produced month. This is reflected in 
the cost structure with a production of 30 units par month. In table 14 , we 
can see that materials now constitute 721 ©f the costs, ^ y further reduc-
tion of the price of these would fce far more important than any marginal 
changes in the other sources of costs, e.g. through the introduction of 
group technology in metal cutting. The second most important source of 
Table 14 Cost structure (estimated) with a production of 30 CNC lathes 







Source: as in table .6 
scale advantage is the use of fixed capital (30%) and interestingly, scale 
advantages arising fron indivisibilities in R&D and prcx3uction planning 
constitutes only 14%. 
The first conclusion to be drawn frcsn this is that a basic requirorient for 
a newconer into the CNC lathe field is to acquire good relations with 
component suppliers, in particular the suppliers of the NC unit and the 
electrical parts, which constitute the lions share of the materials bought 
in. 
Itie second conclusion is that the scale advantages are so great that it is 
•now no longer possible for an entrant in a free trade econcsr^ to initiate 
production in small quantitites and gradually increase the share of CNC lathes t ' • -
in the total production, as has been the policy of this particular firm. 
Specialization and large scale production is now a must. It should be stressed 
that the scale advantages indicated in table 18 do not end at a production 
of 25 to 30 units per month. For example, obtaining a discount for the ma-
terials would reduce production costs to 65% instead of 75% of the production 
costs in the case of very small scale product ico. In terms of prices we can also 
see t h a t attaining t h e scale advantages wnien a r e possible with a production of 
30 units per month is indispensible for market success. Whilst a detailed 
account of the prices is not possible for reasons of confidentiality, it 
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A 
was ©gfeiíTtated thafe, given a gevernitiGnt expert- rebate ©f ©f thg Fei 
price," a gelling prie© in lur©^ ©r the U.S. of areund 8S,000 dollar© 
is not unrealistie. This should fc^ canpared with Japanest prices of around 
100,000 dollars and Taiwanese prices of around 75,000 dollars. Hence, the 
firm should be well below the Japanese prices, even though the product would 
be of inferior standard. An indispensible condition for success is to be 
able to cornpete pricewise with the Japanese. 
5.1.2. Pricing policy 
As noted in section A.2., the firm today has a structure of skills and 
production which reflects a strategy of diversification of production, ain^d 
primarily at the local market. In a climate of free trade, the firm would 
have to specialize production and associated with this, change the structure 
of skills. This means, for example, to increase the numter of skilled assem-
bly workers. In the production of CNC lathes, assembly is relatively more 
important than metal cutting whilst the opposite is the case in the pro-
duction of standard lathes. The readjustment will take a minimum of 2 to 
three years,as, for example, skilled assembly workers in this particular 
field do not exist in Argentina. Hence, it will take a minimum of two 
years before the level of production can be increased to 30 units per month, 
ffeanwhile, the firm has to compete with the Japanese and others. As the 
firm is a newcomer in the market, low price will have to be the base of its 
conpetitive strength. This means that the CNC lathes will need to be priced 
sonewhere near to their long run average cost, which means an initial loss 
until full scale advantages can be reapfed. 
5.1.3. Design concept 
In section 2.1.3 we suggested that a part of the explanation for the 
sucess of the Japanese is that they have widened the spectrum of CNC lathes 
in terms of size, performance and quality. A new entrant, which does not 
have the capability to produce very conplex and/or custom designed machines, 
will have to, so to speak, follow in the breach that the Japanese have" 
opened. Tliis means prcxJucing a CNC lathe which is very simple and cheap. 
To compete via licensing of an 'old' design originating in, say Northern 
Europe, would be fruitless. 
It) sum up; there are three basic conditions which will have to be ful-
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filled if the firm is to have a chance of succeeding. These are: achieving 
a high level of production through specialization, pricing close to long 
run average costs and acquiring 'low cost' designs. 
5.1.4. Effects on the structure of the firm 
The fu l f i l lment of a strategy which sa t i s f i e s these three basic conditions 
would require a dramatic sh i f t in the types of markets the firm would 
penetrate, the size of i t s operations and the type of products i t would 
produce. 
a) With the recent Argentinian policy of tariff reduction in most of 
the engineering sector, the firm's position has changed frcm being the 
leader in a closed hare market to being a very small firm facing inter-
national competition. The requirement of obtaining scale advantages in 
order to survive international competition means that the firm cannot con-
tinue its diversification strategy but has to specialize and produce on 
a large scale. In section 3.1. , we estimated the maximum potential market 
in Argentina to be 90 CNC lathes per annum. This limited hcsne market, in 
relation to the mininai! efficient scale of production , means that the 
firm will have to sell the vast majority of its production on the external 
markets. 
b) The firm therefore needs an established marketing and service network abroad. 
This is exceptionally important in the machine tool industry. 
c) To produce on a lar^ scale, a lot of capital is needed. The capital 
for work in progress alone would perhaps amount to seven million dollars 
per year (were the firm to produce 30 units per month) which is rcwghly 
the size of its annual sales today. The firm will therefore need ca-
pital which it cannot get in Argentina at the moment due to the exceptionally 
t 
high interest rates. 
d) The firm also needs technical information due to its, internationally 
speaking, weak design department. 
e) Due to the present Argentinian econonic crisis, the firm will have to 
initiate an export oriented production very quickly in order to survive. 
Hence, time is a very important váriable. 
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Ble magnitudt ©f fehii tranifermation ana th© sp©®d afe whieh it would have te 
t 
take place suggests that the firm cannot do it alme. Ont option the 
firm would be to collaborate with a firm based in a developed country. Such 
collaborations are conmon in other branches where foreign firms provide designs 
and capital. Another possibility would be that the firm restructures within 
the framework of an Argentinian industrial policy programme. A transformation 
of the kind indicated above is frequently associated with government inter-
ventions in the developed countries. 
5.1.5. Collaboration with a foreign firm 
Wé shall below deal first with the option of collaborating with a firm 
based in a developed country. Then we will briefly review seme conmon 
reasons for state intervention and thereafter discuss the particular case 
of the Argentinian government. 
The reasons for collaborating with a foreign firm would be threefold: 
the need for risk capital, technical information and a marketing network. 
One possible strategy for the firm would then be, at least in the short 
term to acquire a licence and with it some risk capital and access to a 
marketing network. In other words, it would involve a relocation of pro-
duction to a peripheral country (seen fron the point of view of the developed 
country firm) under the control of the foreign firm. The central element 
would be the licence. Let us elaborate on the possibility of such an agreement. 
For a licensor, there are two reasons for being interested" in selling a 
licence to the Argentinian firm. Firstly, to get access to the Argentinian 
and the Brazilian markets. The Argentinian and Brazilian governments agreed 
recently on a Brazilian reduction in tariffs to 5% on CNC lathes; 
i t is far higher for imports from other countries'. As the Bra-
zilian intensity in use of CNC lathes is far behind that of Argenti-
na, ^ ^ a low cost lathe, imported frcm Argentina should have a substantial 
Brazilian market, apart fron the irrare marginal local market. This could 
of course be a sufficient motive for a foreign firm to sell a licence as 
Pontiggia, the largest Italian lathe producer which is one of the 
few successful European competitors to the Japanese, has done to a Bra-
zilian firm. However, the limited size of the local markets would seem in-
sufficient to justify the relatively large input of capital that would be 
needed for the reorganisation and running of the firm. Hence, a possible 
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lie§ne§ ism i feriifo fifffl weuld hiv§ t© fe© eembintá with anefehtr ieuret 
©f finane©. 
The second reascai for a .foreign firm to be interested in a collaboration 
would be that it believes that the Argentinian firm could produce at a 
lower cost than the licensor. There does seem to exist a view in sane firms ^^ 
that a localization of production in a peripheral country could have 
this effect. However, the data on the cost structure in table 6 
makes it difficult to understand such a view. The only sources of a com-
parative advantage that a peripheral firm would have would be a) lower 
direct labour costs, which account for about 11% of the production costs 
in an advanced country like Sweden, b) a skilled labour force which is 
willing to work shifts, i.e. increase machine utilization and c) government 
incentives, e.g. the 25% export retete. 
To base a long term investnient decision on these three factors would hov-j-
ever seem very unlikely. Firstly, technical change is now on the verge of 
allowing for a 24 hour run of the capital stock with the aid of very few 
direct workers.This involves the development of different autonatic feeding 
mechanisms and material handling systems. Secondly, the export reléate could 
easily be scrapped. Hence, that leaves lower direct labour costs and a 
risky rebate as reasons for a large scale capital investment. On the negative 
side there are all the risks of investing in a peripheral ccHontry as well as 
high prices of donestically produced materials(at least in the Argentinian 
case) and the need to have larger stocks due to uncertain deliveries of 
inported components. All in all, whilst the production costs would probably 
be slightly lower in Argentina than in an advanced country, the cost reduction 
would not justify the magnitude of the investment required. This is all the 
more clear when we realize that a decision to locate producticai in a peri-
pheral country would be part of a strategy to combat the Japanese.The maximum 
cost reductions attainable in Argentina would not go very far in breaching 
the gap to the Japanese.In this particular branch there is not such a simple 
solution to the problems faced by the European and U.S. producers. We would 
therefore suggest that the possibility that a foreign firm would participate 
in financing a strategy based on exports to the industrialized world is very 
srnall. 
What about the possibility of reorganising within the framework of an Argen-
tinian industrial policy? First we will discuss sane conmon reasons for 
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State intervention. 
5.1.6. Intervention and the role of the Argentinian governnient 
In the l i terature, we may find a whole set of suggestions as to the 
correctness of seme form of government intervention in a market econony for 
the purpose of generating technological capabi l i t ies . Sane relevant ones 
are summarized as follows. 
(1) Externalities pose a general problem in the allocation of resources 
to in-house R&D activit ies in a market econony. F i rst ly , the increasing 
social division of labour may mean that the benefits in the form of ' learning 
by doing' resulting fron investment act ivity accrues in the form of exter-
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nal it ies . For example, the increased social division of labour in the 
capital goods sector has led to the emergence of specialised engineering 
forms for the design, construction and commission of plants. The benefits 
fron the increased ef f iciency in the operation of these firms, due to accu-
mulated working experience do not accrue to the investing firm but to the 
future custcsners of the engineering firm. The investing firm w i l l though 
have to pay for the costs of the learning in terms of less proficient designs 
etc. This suboptijnality problem did a lso exist in the developed countries 
as they industrialized, as i t does in any market econony, but the point i s 
that today'sdeveloping countries do have an alternative to the development 
of indigeneous sk i l l s , namely experienced firms fron the developed countries. 
The products and services of these firms are then rationally chosen by an 
investing firm in a develping country. This means that engineering firms, as 
well as capital goods producers in the developing countries vhich participate 
in the international market economy, w i l l face a less than socia l ly optimal 
demand, i f any, for their products and services. In cur particular case, the 
experience acquired in designing and producing copying lathes, behind t a r i f f 
barriers, was fundamental in the process of generating the conpetence r e -
quired to design and produce the CNC lathes. I t i s thus a very good example 
of this general thesis. 
Secondly, technical solutions ar is ing from investment in R&D may be d i f f i c u l t 
to appropriate. 
Ohirdly, people are mobile and as s k i l l s are human embodied, the increased 
capabil ities which arise as a by-product of design act iv i t ies may benefit 
other firms. 
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Fourthly, as was suggested in section 2'. 1.2. , there may be iit^^brtant 
inter industry links in the innovative process, indicating that externalities 
may be central to some innovative processes. 
(2) In-house R&D activities in locally owned or managed firms in developing 
countries may be smaller than socially desirable for several other reasons. 
Firstly, we have the canmon reason that the private discount rate is higher 
than the social. This is accentuated by the inherently very long learning 
times in the capital goods sector. Secondly, these reasons may be enhanced 
by the exist aice of multinational conpanies whose often strong conpetitive 
power may induce local firms to discount future benefits still more heavily. 
A perceived very rapid technical change may have the same effect. This 
iirplies that the generation of lx)th the technical solutions and the increased 
capability to provide further solutions, which arise as a by-product of 
design activities, will be suboptimal fron the point of view of the society. 
Por our particular case, historically speaking,an externality of important 
dimension has been that associated with a gradual creation of design skills 
via the gradual increase in complexity of the products designed and produced, 
i.e. the demand from one firm, e.g. a motor car ccmpany for a revolver lathe, 
helped the firm to generate the skills needed to design the CNC lathe which 
is sold to a range of firms other than the motor car firm. 
When we discuss future strategies, externalities are however of less im-
portance. The only type of importance is the correlation between the existence 
of local firms producing CNC lathes and the speed of diffusion of this tech-
nique. The basis for such an externality would be that the local firm would 
have a greater incentive to diffuse information to the local market than would 
a foreign based firm. 
Itie biggest issue for the firm today is however the availability of capital. 
« 
itie firm needs capital to finance a) the transition to large scale and 
specialized production, b) a price policy enabling it to gain market shares 
abroad, c) work in progress which will be dramatically higher than before and 
d) a long term improvement in its design skills. Seme of this capital would 
be risk capital as (i) an export oriented strategy would imply exporting 
close to 90% of the production, which is exceptionally high, (ii) the pene-
tration of external markets wcwld require a very long term view, and therefore 
risky, of profits, and Tiii) the firm perceives very high risks in ccaitinuing 
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iti silf rellane© strategy in dtiign du© t© th@ reeent fait ttehnieal ehangt 
in Q3C lathiS. Por it to design a long term strategy of self reliance, fomt 
form of risk capital is clearly required. 
It would therefore be theoretically correct to say that a governement inter-
vention to provide various types of capital is justified. However, the main 
factor affecting the future of the firm is the exorbitant interest rates 
which are the deliberate creation of several monetarist governments in 
Argentina. Concerning risk capital, the argument for intervention rests on 
the assanption that the state's discount rate is lower than the firm's, i.e. 
that the state has a longer term view of technological developirent than 
the firm. It is however very difficult in this particular circumstance to 
claim that this is the case. Of course, one could argue that a government 
should have a long term view of capability generation. However, the, implicit 
discount rate revealed by the government's industrial policy is clearly higher 
than the firm's. In other words, recent governments' policies reveal such an 
exceptional bias against the local production of capital goods that, assuming 
reasonably informed officials, one cannot but conclude that the state sees 
no value in establishing a long term creation of technological capabilities. 
For governments,though, that are interested in such positive interventions, 
it is justified to discuss how an intervention should be carried out. 
The debate on infant industries has centered on the issues as to whether protec-
tionist policies are required and if so, to what extent and for how long. 
(Concerning the former question, there are, as. we have seen, nany causes for 
sub-cptimality. However, it is very difficult to conclude from those that 
tariff protection and not other means should be applied to correct the dis-
crepancies between private and social profitability. The problem with tariff 
protection is that there is no direct link between the intervention and the 
type of result that one wants to achieve, e.g. iinproved design skills. Indeed» 
whilst there is no doubt that protection has been associated with capabili-
ty generation, there is really nothing to indicate that it is the best way 
to create these capabilities. 
Itie OTily argument that one can suggest in favcxir of tariff protection is that 
during an initial period of industrialization, the perceived risks of esta-
blishing new activities may be so great that nobody starts any even if there 
are long term benefits associated with the activity. 
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Constrning the problem of the design of a protectionist policy, Corden, 
37 amongst others,, writes:*" 
"The essential idea of uniformity is that the same rates of protection 
be provided for al l investment activites in manufacturing so that 
there is no discimination other than which comes naturally out 
of the price system. Thus, as far as possible, the principle of 
ccsnparative advantage is applied" (our emphasis) 
Hence, a 'neutral' protection is favoured. However, the question is; neutral 
in relation to what? As the basis for protection is that it takes time to 
learn the basis of an industrial activity, the reference point in designing 
a protectionist system must be the 'learning tiine' required in different 
industries. That is, if we compare the learning time in the production 
(assembly) of hoiie electronics with the production of machine tools, we will 
most certainly find that the latter is far longer. Hence, a uniform protec-
tion policy which would constitute sonne form of average between the two 
would be very disciminating against machine tools. Hence, branch or pro-
duct specific intervention is clearly to be preferred. 
Given that differential rates of protection are required, the next question 
is how long should it continue? In this particular case, roughly ten years 
would have been an appropriate period of protection. We saw however in section 
4.2. that the protectionist policy was not discontinued thereafter and the 
consequences it had for the firm. Today, there is a strong pressure fron 
Argentinian industry to go back to the pre 1976 very high levels of protection 
and the firm has applied for, and will probably receive, a 35% noninal rate 
of protection on CNC lathes. For the firm, such protection wcwld practically 
make it a monopolist on the market for the less conplex CNC lathes, and it 
would be able to acquire profits to finance an export drive. Por exactly 
this reason, it would seem tempting to recomiend protection. However, as we 
are now talking at»ut the development of specific skills and a specific 
reorganisation of the firm instead of the creaticai of general skills, it would 
be more appropriate to directly subsidize these activities by providing 
capital with low interest rate. 
There are two reasons for choosing a subsidy instead of protection. Firstly, 
a tariff would perhaps result in a reorganisation of the firm, but would not 
necessarily have this effect. This ccxald though be secured by including a 
clause ensuring that the tariff was linked to the firm's achievement of 
- 44 -
c) 
spécific goals, a ® most impartant reason for ch<x>sing a subsidy though, 
is that any tariff on Q3C lathes would incrtas® th© cost of capital and 
h©ne© reduce th© .rati of diffusion of ntw ttchnol^y in the whole @ngi-
neering sector. As machine tools are the bearers of much of the new technology 
in metal working, it is dangerous for any economy to impede 
the flow of imports. In other words, it is tetter to pay subsidies directly 
to the local firm producing CNC lathes than let the metal working sector 
pay for all the CNC lathes the firm does not sell. 
To conclude, the nost important factor determining the firm's continuity in 
building technological capabilities through taking the step into the specialized 
production of CNC lathes is the availability of capital at a reasonable cost 
as well as a large amount of risk capital. We have also argued that there 
is no basis for state intervention judging frcm the present and recent Ar-
gentinian governments' revealed objective function. 
The government is however not a logical entity as it continues with its 
predecessor's policy of paying a 25% rebate on the FoB price of exported 
machine tools. This rebate is fundamental in creating price conpetitiveness 
for the firm in export markets, in both the short and medium term . Sane 
of the rebate can be seen as a corpensation for the high dcmestic costs of 
materials, such as steel, but the greater part of it is a pure export sub-
sidy. The subsidy would, in the case of a producticai of 30 units per mcnth, 
amount to an equivalent of half the local content of production costs(excluding 
profits of the firm). This is, of course, a very large subsidy. However, if 
we conpare it with the.magnitude of the scale economies in materials alone, 
the attainment of maximum (30%) discounts would imply a sum equivalent to 
half of this very large rebate. Hence, the export subsidy compensates for 
the high donestic raw material prices and most importantly, as there are 
large scale ^vantages, it permits a pricing of the CNC lathes which is 
closer to its long run average costs. This effect is, howeverj, created irore 
by chance than by design. Hence, the state finances roughly the difference 
tetween the production costs today and the longrun average production costs. 
lb seme extent, the export subsidy takes care of the problem of risk capital; 
that is the capital associated with pursuing a marketing policy with a very 
long term view on profits. However, it is conducive cnly to production of 
CNC lathes and not to the local development of designs. Furthermore, it is 
not sufficient to solve the problem of working capital which is bound to 
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increase as prcídüctioh is specialized to piC lathes and expanded to gain 
scale advantages. Hence, risk capital specifically supplied to ease these 
problems is. required in addition to the export subsidy. 
The firm cannot however count on an active governinent policy. It cannot 
either count on any large scale collaboration with a foreign firm. This means 
that the firm's option of an export oriented growth strategy is not a valid 
one. With a proper government policy since the early 1970s,a firm would have 
been created which would have penetrated foreign markets with parallel 
lathes and had close contact with product dévelopnents on the world market. 
Ihe obstacles to a transformation would then have been much smaller. A large 
amount of capital would still have been needed though, so everything cannot 
be blaimed on inproper government policies. A large part of the problem has been 
caused by changes in the international structure of the CNC lathe branch. 
Unfortunately for the firm, both these factors work against its possibilities 
for success. Let us therefore turn to the second scenario; involving a 
penetration of the regional markets only. 
5.2. The regional market strategy 
As noted above, the Argentinian and Brazilian Governments agreed recently 
to reduce the tariffs on NCMTs to 5%, amongst other products. This is very 
important as the Brazilian tariff for other countries is prohibitive and 
Brazil's engineering sector is 3-4 times the size of Argentina's. In the 
absence of any large scale local producer in Brazil, the Brazilian market 
would seem to be very important for an Argentinian firm producing CNC lathes-» 
liie size of the market is howe^r today rather limited - only about 200 CNC 
lathes are installed in Brazil. Even though one would expect the size of 
the market to increase with the introduction of a CNC lathe priced not far 
above the international price, the total market of Argentina and Brazil would 
be below the required minimum level of production for caie firm, given free 
trade. 
However, with the Brazilian tariff policy, which is not likely to be changed 
due to Brazil's severe balance of payment problem, and the likelihood of an 
Argentinian tariff of 35% on CNC lathes, the price of inported Q^C lathes will 
be much higher than the international price. This means that for domestic 
producers, the minimum efficient scale of productican will decrease substantially. 
Hence, in a world of tariffs, 300 units per year can be substantially reduced. 
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.4 
A Strategy aiming at mainly penetrating the local markets would therefore 
put less pressure on the firm to drastically increase the volume of outfxit. 
This implies that the capital requirerrents would also be reduced as less 
capital for work in progress would be required, Purthernrare, as the firm 
has sold a fair number of conventional lathes to Brazil, the problem of a 
marketing network would not be so great. This means that the need for 
collaborating with a foreign firm would be less than in the case of the 
full scale export strategy. However, given that no capital will be available 
from the Argentinian side, and that a fast drive to exploit the dormant 
Brazilian market would require scsne extra capital, a collaboration agreement 
would still be of interest to the Argentinian firm. This would be strengthened 
by the need for technical information even though this too would be less 
accentuated if it were to cortpete on the relatively unsophisticated Bra-
zilian market. 
A further reason in favour of licensing, in this scenario, is that 
it may reduce the price of the conponents. In one case, a firm who has 
a licence from a large Italian firm receives a 20%discount on a l l the electrical 
and electronic conponents which it is forced to buy fron the Italian firm. 
This firm, in turn, has a 30%discount fron the producer of the conponents 
and makes a nice profit from the 10% differential. Por a firm beginning to 
produce CNC lathes, an agreement of this kind is most advantageous as an 
important source of scale advantages, and thus barrier to entry, lies 
precisely in the discount on conponents. Hence, the need for a large scale 
production is considerably reduced with such an agreement. 
Ihe correct, and perhaps the only possible strategy for the firm would there-
fore be to pursue a short term strategy of licensing with its marketing 
efforts directed towards the regional markets. This waild appear to be a 
viable alternative also as it seem reasonable to think that a foreign firm 
would be interested in supplying a design and limited financial assistance 
t 
for the exploitation of the regional markets in Latin America. However, 
we should keep in mind that we are not dealing with a free trade world and 
that the success of a strategy aimed at exploiting only the regional markets 
is profoundly dependent on the existence of tariffs or other trade barriers. 
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Given that licensing ought to be a part of the firm's short term strategy, 
the questicai remain to be answered is licence from whan? Two conditions 
must be met by the licensor; firstly, it has to have a production of 
QJC lathes which is so large that they receive the maximum discount possible. 
This will , in turn, permit the licensee to receive seme of that discount. 
Secondly, it has to produce a smaller and cheaper CNC lathe which is 
designed for mass markets. Only producers fron two countries fulfill 
these conditions; Japan and Italy. As the largest Brazilian firm of machine 
tools, which is now entering into production of CNC lathes, has reached 
a licence agreement with the most successful Italian producer, it appears 
as a competitor ought to go for the Japanese. As is evidenced by the Tai-
wanese experience, there are Japanese firms which are quite prepared to license 
39 their designs for the exploitiation of local markets. 
5.3. The long run case 
l-Jhat about in the long run? Should the firm limit itself to producing for the 
regional markets and should it depend on the availability of foreign licences 
for " its technical achievements? 
The most important question to answer is whether or not they will be able to 
compete with the Japanese. In the short run, we would say no, but in 
the long run there are a number of relevant observations to be made. Firstly, 
the market for CNC lathes is expanding rapidly and there is no reason v^y it 
should be saturated within the next five to ten years. Particularly not . if 
the diversification process of CNC lathes designs continues, creating cheaper 
and sinpler designs. Conversely, the market for standard lathes is expected 
to decrease even more. Secondly, the Japanese are likely to move into the 
production of more sophisticated products since they have penetrated large 
parts of the markets for the cheaper CNC lathes, rather than designing even 
siirpler CNC lathes. They are also more likely to move into the developnent 
of production systems. Today, they are in fact putting a lot of emphasis into 
developing a) robotics b) a production capacity in machining centers which 
is a canbined milling, drilling and boring machine. Together with CNC lathes 
and robotics, they will then have the key parts of autonated . Production 
systems in their hands. 
Itiirdly, technical change in terms of new low cost designs is probably slo-
wing down and we will see a series of responses to the Japanese challenge 
which, if not copies, will be very similar in design concepts. 
with relatively cheap and good engineers, a firm like the Argentinian one would 
be able to break into the market on the basis of good designs. A good design 
in this context is one which follows in the breach that the Japanese have 
opened and which puts at least as much emphasis on low cost and simplicity 
as the Japanese do. líiis would be particularly important for penetrating 
third world markets where users often do not have large amounts of capital 
and certainly less knowledge of advanced metalcutting techniques. 
This takes us into the long run conparative advantage of the Argentinian 
firm. As.we saw in earlier sections, its cheaper direct labour will provide 
only a marginal cost advantage which anyway nay be swamped by other factors 
such as high material costs. Its only long run source of conparative advantage 
can be in a strong design team and not a dramatically lower cost of pro-
duction. 
Of course, a discussion of a long term conparative advantage assumes a free 
trade context. If we assume the continuation of tariff protection and access 
to the Brazilian markets, the firm would perceive much less need to continue 
to develop its own designs. Especially if a licence agreement was associated 
with access to low priced conponents. However, if the firm wants to move out of 
the regional context and penetrate the world market, it will need to continue 
to strengthen its design skills. Today, it has discontinued its design 
efforts and changed its philosophy to licensing. If this continues, the 
firm's strategies in the future will be limited to the regional markets 
and, hence, the future of CNC lathe production in Argentina will be depen-
dent upon tariff protection of the Brazilian market. This is an unhappy 
decision for the Argentinian econony, but a reasonably rational one for 
the firm under the present circumstances. A proper government policy would 
include the support for a short term policy of licensing by the firm but 
t 
a nedium and long term policy of 1t developing its own designs. Hcwever, as 




At the global level, there is a strong trend tapiarás substituting standard 
lathes by CNC lathes» Given the central role of the machine tool industry 
in the capital gcxds sector^ we asked the question under what conditions a 
NIC based firm would be able to switch from the design and production of 
standard lathes to CNC lathes. 
Fran the above, it is clear that very drastic changes have occurred since 
1975/75 when micro electronic control units were introduced» The most im-
portant single factor is that the barriers to entry in the form of minimum 
efficient scale of production have increased dramatically. This is partly a 
reflection of the maturity of the product; it is now going into the mass 
production stage. Associated with the move towards mass production is 
a widening of the spectrum of designs as well as a standardization of the 
electronic control units so that any producer of a standard CNC lathe 
can buy in that conponent without any large problems. Both these aspects 
benefit firms in the NICs. However, the large minimum efficient scale of 
production as well as increased design skill requireirents means that for 
individual small firms to take the step into design and production of 
CNC lathes, sore sort of active government policy is acutely needed. The 
purpose of goverment intervention would basically be to reduce the risks in-
volved in a larger transition. 
The developed countries' governments are very much involved in such inter-
vention programmes and if the NIC Governments do not respond^ 
the possibilities for a successful production of Q^C lathes in the NICs \ 
will be greatly reduced. In other words, if the technological gap is not to 
increase in the production of machine tools, specific government involven^nt 
is needed in the NICs. 
In the case of Argentina, the government has not teen willing to provide 
this support. The possibilities for the leading Argentinian lathe producer 
to successfully take the step into the design and production of Q3C lathes 
has been further reduced by inappropriate government policies of indiscriminate 
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protection over the past ten years. This has, in corttoination with a small 
local market, created a structure of the firm which is not conducive to a' 
rapid shift to CNC lathes. Future CNC lathe production in Argentina is 
therefore dependent on the existence of low tariff barriers for export to 
the Brazilian market from Argentina, but high tariffs for exports fron 
other countries. This is, of course, an exceptionally feeble basis for 
the future. Without government intervention, one could then conclude that 
the substitution of CNC lathes for standard lathes at the world level, com-
bined with the trade and industrial policies of recent and present Argentinian 
governments will probably lead to the destructicn of its best firm in the 
metal cutting machine tool area, as well as a waste of 20 years of capability 
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Method in estimating the potential for NC lathes in Argentina 
Bie size of the market for NC lathes in any economy is a function of a) 
the economic profitability of the technology in comparison with conven-
tional machine tools and b) the number of times this choice is made, i.e. 
the size of the industrial branches which can use NC lathes as a fart of 
their production prcx^ esso It has been shown that NC technology 
reflects a technical change which is at least as advantageous to the 
NICs as to the developed countries o This was based on the assumption that 
metal working skills are scarcer in the NICs than in the developed 
countries. Given that a greater scarcity dc^s not always mean a higher 
salary, it is relevant to ask if the micro econcMic choice of technique 
would be the same in a NIC as in, say, Sweden» An analysis of the Argentinian 
case, using Argentinian cost data suggests that for all non extreme situ-
ations, such as 30% real interest rate, the micro econanic choice of tech-
nique is very similar for Sweden, an advanced country, and Argentina, which 
may be said to represent a NIC„ 
Bie size of the market depends then on the magnitude of the relevant branches 
which can use NC lathes in their production process. Hence, when discussing 
the size of the market in any country, it is vital to analyse the structure 
of the engineering sector 
To understand the differences in use of NC lathes by 
branch, the diffusion pattern in Sweden was studied at the four and five 
digit level. The data refer to 1976» It was found that eight subsectors 
contained 85% of the NC latheso These ares Tools and Implements (3811); 
Engines & Turbines (3821)5 Agricultural Machinery (3§22)5 Metal and Wood 
Working Machinery (3823)i Special Industrial Machinery (3824); Other non-
Electrical Machinery (3329)5 Electrical Machinery (3831) and Automobile 
Parts (38432). Hence, it is the size and growth pattern of these eight 
branches which are of interest to us in determining the relationship 
between industrial structure and the market for NC lathes. 
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In fehi ^fénfeiniin §§§§, dafea iím I N ^ ihews fchati uiinf a movinf avieafi, 
ths inpertanei ©f thüi tight bganehti frtw fsem 26.71 fe© 37.61 ©f feht 
valuf o£ preduetien in tht tnginiteiñg iteter during tht 1970'i. Tht áati 
ais© ihowi that thrtt ©f the fastest growing branches were;'special 
industrial machinery (3823), other non electrical machinery (38299), and 
car conponents (38432). These three branches contained 61% of the NC lathes 
in Sweden in 1976. Furthermore, they show the highest intensity in use 
of NC lathes in Sweden in 1976. Hence, there has been a change in the structure 
of the Argentinian engineering sector which appears to be conducive to 
the demand for NC lathes. We have to st i l l keep in mind though the relati-
vely small absolute level of production in Argentina. It was estimated that 
the value of output in the eight relevant branches amounted to only 2.5 
billion dollars in 1977/78 whilst in the case of Sweden, the equivalent figure 
was over seven billions in the same year. 
The method used to estimate the potential demand for NC lathes is a simple 
one. It is assumed that the variations in intensity in use of NC lathes 
between branches reflect their different technical characteristics of pro-
duction. For example, special industrial machinery, which has one of the 
highest intensities in.the use of IC: lathes, contains more batch production and 
more metal cutting than the production of office machinery. We furthermore 
assume that the content of production at the four and five digit levels 
is roughly the same in Sweden and Argentina. This is a much more difficult 
assumption to make as the heterogeneity of products is very large in the 
metal working sector. There is however no way that this assumption can be 
tested with the poor data base" in Argentina. 
After calculating the estimated sales value in Argentina in 1977/78, we 
multiply this at four and five digit level with the intensity figures of NC 
lathes in Sweden in mid 1976. Ihis '1976 potential' can be seen in table 1.. 
The eight branches in table 1 accounted for 85% of the NC lathes in Sweden 
in 1976. Hence, we need to add 15% if we are to get a correct estimate. 
The total potential would then be 227 NC lathes. However, the total stock 
of NQvlTs increased from 2,100 in mid 1976 to 3,900 in 1979. Today, it is i." 
surely more than 4,200. Hence, if we assume that the proporticn of NC lathes 
to all NCMTs is the same as in 1976, we need to double the 1976 potential l\ 
in order to acquire a correct estimate of the '1981* potential for Argentina. 
This would be around 454 NC lathes. 
Table ^ Ihe' '1976 potential' for NC lathes in Argentir. •id 
Branch '1976 potential' Actual 
(ISIC) 
3811 3 31 
3821* 6 7 
3822 28 1 
3823/4 54 23 
38299 23 46 
3831 13 1 
38432 72 43 
Total 193 152 
* * 
* U.K. data 
** I have assumed that the NC lathes for which I have no information 
on branch distribution are distributed in the same way as the ones 
for which I have information. 
Source: Survey by the author and elaboration on H. Sten: Rapporter frán 
Sveriges Mekanfórbund 10.8.76, 21.10.76, 8.9.77 
Hence, in order to reach the same intensity in use of NC lathes as in 
Sweden in 1981, the total number of NC lathes would need to be 454. In this 
exercise we have used the level of sales in 1977/78 in Argentina as the 
denominator. If the econony expands, we wcxild need to add a given number of 
new NC lathes to the potential. In table 2 we can see me way of estimating 
the demand for NC lathes during the following fiv^ year period. We differentiate 
between NC lathes sold to realize the given potential and new potential as 
t ' 
a result from an expansion of the sales in these eight branches. We assune 
in this exaiiple that the realization potential is reached in five years and 
that there is a continuation of the historical growth rate of 5.9% in the 
eight branches concerned. 
The limitaticais of such a mechanistic analysis are many. First of all we 
need to remenüDer the assuirptions made. Secondly^ the peculiarities of 
the Argentinian situation should be borne in mind. For exanple,. the econony 
is very erratic, in additicsi to being a very small market. There is therefore 
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